Abstract A secure data gathering in a Wireless Sensor Network(WSN) has given attention to one of security issues. In general, the process of secure data gathering causes difficulties: one process is exchanging the secured data and the other is constructing secured data path. The previous studies have been resolving the difficulties in terms of two problems: security and data gathering in WSNs. However, a WSN requires a protocol that has to guarantee a security of path between sensors and sink, or a cluster head. Thus how to gather data securely is an important issue. In this paper, we propose a secure data gathering protocol over WSNs, which consists of hierarchical key settlement and secure path construction, and aims at tackling two problems. The proposed protocol causes little overhead to sensor nodes for secured key settlement and path construction. This work provides security analysis focused on the key settlement protocol and evaluates network performance for the proposed data gathering protocol through simulation.
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks(WSN) have been widely applied in applications for health, military, home, commercial industries, etc. These applications periodically need data upcoming from sensors [1, 2] . In a hierarchical WSN, a sensory data is periodically gathered in cluster head and then forwarded to the sink. This method for collecting data makes them very vulnerable to adversary's malicious attacks [3] . The security threats to a WSN are different from the threats of the other wireless networks due to the broadcast nature. In practical, sensor nodes are very fragile since the data may also be physically captured or easily destroyed by the attackers. This is because WSNs are consists of large numbers of wirelessly connected heterogeneous sensor nodes, and which are spatially distributed across a large field of interest [4] .
If, for example, a sensor node on a path is compromised by an attacker, illegal nodes, such as the node with detouring routing paths or with depleted energy, in a routing path will be included. This means that the data requires to be passed a slightly longer path to reach at destination for includes compromised information. A case in point, an adversary can physically compromise a subset of sensor nodes in a WSN to eavesdrop information [5] .
Research into security and routing confidentiality mechanisms designed specifically for sensor data has been challenging, thus such tackled protocol usually has been focused into an avoidance-and a detection-based study that are defense method and pre-computation, respectively, against attackers.
Although the avoidance methods are more powerful than the detection, it is hard to apply sensor domains due to the limited hardware capability; in most cases they need pre-computation processes. There was a new security challenge to cope with, named multiple-stage attack. Attack with multiple compromised nodes is a typical multiple-stage attack to acquire network information and transmit false data.
The multiple-stage attack is generally composed of three stages. First, an adversary captures some sensor nodes, and then compromises these nodes using various tools, such as exploits; and then, these compromised nodes are redeployed into the network;
lastly, the adversary can use these compromised nodes to attempt various security attacks, such as false data injection, selective forwarding, wormholes and Sybil attacks [6] , to jeopardize the whole networks. Since sensor nodes are randomly deployed and unattended, nodes easily are compromised. When an adversary launches a compromise attack, the adversary can simply use a programming board and a serial cable to easily compromise the sensor node in the first stage.
The detection of compromised nodes in this case is very difficult task. So, there are some avoidance methods to deal with the attacks using compromised nodes [7] . Sang et al. in [8] addressed that security protocol using a globally shared key on link layer is completely ineffective in presence of insider attacks or compromised nodes [9] . Secure routing methods in [10] for WSN applications are proposed, but none of them are designed with the security considerations, especially focused in terms of compromised nodes.
In order to solve problems related to multiple compromised nodes, this paper proposes a Secure Data Gathering Protocol(SDGP) over WSN, which is consists of three phases: hierarchical key settlement, secure path construction, and secure path based data gathering. Hierarchical key settlement phase, at first, is for setting up network parameters and key generation procedure. And then a secure path construction phase is to establish multiple secure paths between cluster heads and sink node by using data encryption and message digest to support confidentiality and integrity, based on the established keys from the key settlement.
Finally, secure path based data gathering phase is to collect data in WSN by relaying data packets from the source node to the sink based on the multiple secure paths. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
First, it identifies the security problem which is occurred by multiple compromised nodes in WSNs.
Second, it effectively proposes a secure data gathering protocol through the hierarchical non-interactive identity-based authenticated key agreement, and gives a clue of problems related to multiple compromised nodes. Lastly, it provides an analytical model for evaluating a network security performance from the compromised nodes.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review related works in WSNs. In section 3, we propose a secure data gathering protocol. Security analyses and performance evaluations are following in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Works
Multipath routing in WSNs have received considerable attentions and have used for different goals, such as load balancing, energy efficiency, security, and so on. However, multipath routing has problems focused on the encoding issue and key agreement for resolving security problem and data gathering for load balancing and energy efficiency [1] [2] .
Packet encoding and key agreement issues in WSN have been intensively researched to improve security in data collection. Shamir [17] proposed an algorithm to break a data packet into a few shares by using the (t, n)-threshold secret sharing algorithm and then deliver shares via different routing paths. A packet is broken into shares, which are sent to sink through randomly generated paths. However, the algorithm looks like it could effectively keep data in safe from the compromised nodes but it has security problem when they could collect t data shares, which could form the original data from the shares. The secret-sharing and routing parameters in [11] are optimized to minimize the energy cost for a given packet delivery probability constraint. Recently, Yuxin et al. [3] proposed a Feedback-Based Secure Path approach (FBSP) based on Shamir's algorithm to establish multiple secure paths. The secure paths in the FBSP are not always secure and furthermore, the approach shares the security problems in Simmer's algorithm.
To achieve secure routing in WSNs, Shamir's algorithm was applied to ad hoc on-demand multipath distance vector routing in [12] and data are split into multiple shares and transmitted to multipath by using maximally disjoint paths in [13] . A non-interactive hierarchical key agreement protocol using Pairings in [14] is similar to other key agreement protocols for authentication. Bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, which was introduced by Boneh and Franklin in [15] . The authors in [16] addressed that cryptographic operation is required while any attacking challenge is detected, and proposed the secure aggregation tree that is built in such a way that the child is able to listen all the incoming data from its sibling to its father so that the child nodes can observe the behavior of its father, then the cheating activity of any non-leaf node can be detected. However, it does not provide data confidentiality. Ozdemir [7] proposed, to develop trustworthiness for environments and neighboring nodes, a secure and reliable data aggregation in WSNs. If an aggregating node is under attack (e.g. denial of service attack), it is detected by using the monitoring system. This approach provides data integrity and source authentication, but does not provide data confidentiality.
Secure Data Gathering Protocol
This section presents a Secure Data Gathering Protocol(SDGP) with a hierarchical structure, which is composed of two phases: hierarchical key settlement and secure path construction, which are referred to as the Phases I and II respectively. The Phase I is for setting up network parameters and key generation procedure. Multiple secure paths between source nodes toward sink are established in the Phase II by using data encryption and the message digest based on the established keys from the key settlement. In this paper, the proposed protocol assumes a hierarchical WSN, which is represented to a hierarchical tree with depth 3. The degrees of the sink and cluster heads are j and k, respectively, which are determined by the number of nodes, n, in a WSN.
Phase I: Hierarchical Key Settlement
In the Phase I, in order to establish a shared key between two nodes in a WSN, we use the pre-established secret keys method for the simplicity to establish credential between two entities. After this phase, all nodes have a pair of keys, public key and private key, for the public key cryptosystem. In general, all sensor nodes in WSN belong to the same administrative entity, such as the sink (or cluster head from member sensor nodes point of view), but the Internet has multi-administrative entities. In security applications for WSNs, it is reasonable that sensor nodes in the initial state know each other, and thus trust as they can exchange information in the plaintext mode. Fig. 1 shows a procedure of a hierarchical key settlement for hierarchical WSN. In Step 2. When a cluster head with identities IDCH
receives the message, it computes PCH=h(IDCH)
and PCH•S2. After that, it stores the information in it's memory and sends {{PS• S1, PCH•S2, S3}, PS, PCH} to it's member nodes.
Step 3 
Phase II: Secure Path Construction
The purpose of SDGP is to reduce the probability that the compromised nodes are in the secure paths and also to be not effected on the confidentiality of data even if they are in the paths. This phase uses encryption/decryption, MAC, and (t, n) threshold mechanism based on the keys from the Phase I.
Notations used in the Phase II are listed in Table 1 .
The goal of this phase for the SDGP is to establish multiple secure paths between source nodes and sink using the settled keys in Phase I. Encrypted and fragmented data are transmitted to the sink over the secured multi paths. After processing this Phase II, the sink would determine secure paths. The Phase II for constructing secure path is shown in Fig. 2 . The symbols of the sink, cluster heads, and member nodes use identical symbols with those of Fig. 1 , and it operates to as follows:
Step 
. Only if the MAC validation is successful, CHj breaks the data into n shares according to the (t, n)-threshold algorithm, computes MAC=h(sk||the data share)
for each share, and forwards them to the neighbor heads after it adds its identity CHj to LR.
Step 3. When a cluster head CHm receives a share, it adds its identity CHm to LR. The share of data is forwarded by a collection of relay heads until it reaches sink.
Step 4. On the arrival of the share, sink decrypts the Step 5. Sink adds the secure path LR to a notification packet and sends the packet with the trust value C to the source node by using the route in LR. Here, C is used as a counter with an initial value t (t>0), which represents credibility level of the route. The notification packet contains the secure path for data collection and the credibility of the path, C.
Step 6. When a cluster head CHo receives the packet, it extracts a sub-path Po={ CHo+1, CHo+2, …, CHn } from LR and stores it into its local cache only if its identity is within LR. CHo extracts its next-hop cluster head CHo-1 from LR and forwards the packet to the head.
Step 7. When the cluster head CHj receives the packet, it extracts LR from the packet, and stores it in its local cache. Step 1. When a source member node CHk intends to send a data share from the (t, n) threshold mechanism to the sink, it first checks whether the application requires data aggregation at the cluster head or not.
• If it does not require data aggregation, then CHk Step 3. When a cluster head CHi receives the share, it first checks if the cluster head CHi+1 in LR is in its neighbor list. If the head is not in the list, it just performs random multipath routing and path construction. Otherwise, it sends the share to the head CHi+1 in LR.
Step 4. On the arrival of the share to the sink successfully, the sink generates a session key sk with CMk or CHj depending on the included ID set in the message. If the ID set is {PS′, PCHj′, PCM
generates sk=ê(PS•S1, PS)• ê(PCHj′, PS)S2•ê(PCMk′, PS)S3. Otherwise, it generates sk=ê(PS•S1, PS)•ê(PCHj•S2, PS)
•ê(PCHj, PS)S3 by using the ID set {PS, PCHj} CHj. In the case that the application requires data aggregation, CHj requires additional operations that it decrypts and collects data from it's member nodes, and after that it aggregates the collected data and encrypts the data by establishing a new session key sk with the sink. Otherwise, CHj sends the encrypted data with the MAC to the sink by using the secure paths stored in its local cache. When a cluster head CHi receives the share, it also checks its local cache to find out a secure path and sends the share to the CHi+1 in LR bounded to the sink. As soon as the share arrives, it manages the credential counter C depending on the credibility.
By using these procedures, SDGP could safely cope with the attacks from the multiple compromised nodes even if more than t data shares are exposed to the compromised nodes. Furthermore, to reduce the probability that paths contain the compromised nodes, the sink assigns path's credibility level C (C>) depending on the transmission delay, where  is the permitted transmission delay determined by considering the network characteristics. This means that a path with longer latency than the other paths considers that the path has the compromised nodes and in that case, SDGP drops the path because there is high possibility that the transmission delay could be increased due to the interrupts for the compromised nodes. If the share is arrived in a certain delay threshold, the sink extracts the path and assigns the proper path credibility level C. The secure path is set C depending on the credibility level, which means that higher value represents more secure than the lower value. The credibility level could be synchronized between sink and every cluster heads in the feed-back steps.
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Security Analysis
Since the core mechanism in SDGP is based on the proposed hierarchical key settlement described in 
Computational Problems
Bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem, which was introduced by Boneh and Franklin in [15] . The security of SDGP relies on a variant of the BDH assumption.
Let G and GT be two groups of a prime order q.
Suppose that there exists a bilinear map ê: GⅹG→GT.
We consider the following computational assumptions 
Security Analysis
Our security analysis is focused on verifying the overall security requirements for the proposed hierarchical key settlement including passive and active attacks as follows.
Proposition 1. The proposed hierarchical key settlement is secure against passive and active attacks.
Proof: Assuming that an adversary is success if the adversary could learn some useful information from the intercepted messages. We show that probability to succeed in learning them is negligible due to the difficulties of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
1. A completeness of the key agreement protocol is already proven by describing the run of the protocol in section 3.
2. If the adversary is passive adversary, all information the adversary can gather are as follows:
the ID set {PS′, PCHj′, PCMk′}, the path set LR ={CHm,CHm+1,…,CHz}, and the message digest MAC.
However, it is negligible to find the key related information from them due to the difficulties of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
Finally, we could say our protocol is secure against passive attack.
Proposition 2. The proposed hierarchical key settlement is secure against active attack.
Proof: Assuming that an adversary is success if the adversary finds the session key sk or the session key related information {S1, S2, S3}. Therefore, we show that probability to succeed in finding them is negligible due to the difficulties of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
The acceptance by all entities means that each
MAC in the corresponding message is successfully verified. That is, MAC is decrypted and verified successfully by using the correct session key sk. We show that if it is the case that entities accept the messages and continue the session, then the probability that the adversary has modified the messages being transmitted is negligible. And the only way for the adversary to find the session key or security related information is to solve the difficulties of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
2. Now, we consider the active adversary with following cases. Finally, we could say our protocol is secure against active attack.
Security Operation Overhead
Security operation in SDGP is affected to the overall performance of the target network. In this subsection,
we will compare SDGP with FBSP in the perspective of security [3] . For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost of security related operation only, we define some notations as the same as in [19] as follows.
TGe 
Performance Evaluations
To validate the proposed protocol, this section assumes that compromised nodes on network layer attempts an attack that drops or retransmits packets.
We provide comparisons between the proposed protocol, SDGP and feedback-based secure path approach (FBSP) from [3] in terms of a ratio of receiving packets and energy consumption.
Metrics and Simulation Setting
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the performance of SDGP through extensive simulation. In When a wireless sensor network is attacked by compromised nodes, the compromised node tries to send a false message to sensor's the destination. Fig. 5 represents the case of retransmitting packets again after packet is intercepted by compromised nodes. This is to disperse altered information in the entire networks. In our proposed scheme, altered information can be transmitted to sink. The ratio of receiving packets in proposed scheme decreases slower than that of FBSP due to the process of security, as shown in The results from the security analyses and network performance evaluations show that SDGP supports better security and good performance.
